With the growing imbalance of public sectors in the EU Member States, the public debt in the countries increased too. Public debt management institutions face the task of choosing the optimal debt structure in order to minimize the negative effects for the economy. This article sets out to determine changes in the public debt structure in the EU Member States during economic crisis. It consists of four sections. Section one deals with public debt management under crisis conditions. In the next sections, the term, currency and lender structure of public debt in the new Member States are analysed and discussed. The last section presents major conclusions from the research.
Introduction
In today's world public debt is an inseparable characteristic of most freemarket economies. Institutions managing public debt must determine its structures to minimize its negative impacts on the economy. This article seeks to identify changes in the structure of public debt in new EU Member States during economic crisis, which reflect the countries' approach to public debt management and the situation of their public finance sectors affected by economic instability. To accomplish this purpose, the following research hypotheses have been formulated: − to cope with the rising borrowing needs of the public sector in the period of crisis, the public debt management institutions increased the value of short-term borrowing, − most of the debt incurred by the public debt management institutions was denominated in national currencies in order to reduce the exchange risk. − the share of financial institutions in the lender structure of public debt increased in the period of crisis, as these institutions sought for low-risk investment instruments, In the article, the public debt in all the new EU Member States is analysed by its term, currency and lender structure. To ensure comparability between countries, the data on entire public finance (General Government) sectors are used (and not only those showing the State Treasury's debt). The period of research covers the years [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . The "new EU Member State" is defined in the article as the country which joined EU structures in 2004 or later, with one exception: Croatia was excluded for the research, as it joined EU structures in 2013 (after the end of the research period). It needs to be noticed that the institutions managing public debt can directly determine only the structure of the Treasury debt which is only one of the items making up the debt of the whole public finance sector. In practice, the Member States manage public debt based on one of three models which are called a ministerial model, a banking model and an agency model [for details see, for instance, Marchewka-Bartkowiak 2008, p. 139] . Regardless of the models' characteristics or the controversies concerning their use [see Piotrowska-Marczak, Uryszek 2009, pp. 64-65] , none of them allows the direct control over the structure of subnational debt, which is shaped by regional or local governments borrowing in their own name and on their own account. The central government can control this component of public debt only indirectly by issuing orders and bans, or by imposing caps on its amounts. This mechanism, however, falls under the broad definition of public debt management. Institutions determining the structure of public debt at the central level have not powers over its local composition.
The term structure of public debt
Public debt is mainly managed through its term structure. One outcome of disproportionately large amount of short-term instruments in the structure of public debt is increased exposure to refinancing risk [Uryszek 2011, pp. 66-77] and interest rate risk [Uryszek 2010, pp. 73-87] . Public authorities choos-ing to borrow short term have to seek funds relatively often and have to pay different prices. Sometimes such funds may not be achievable at all. The proportion of short-term debt (with maturity to one year) in the General Government debt structure in the new Member States is shown in table 2. Cyprus % n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a EUR mn n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Financial crisis augmented the share of short-term instruments in the structure of public debt in most new EU Member States. Between 2007 and 2009 the proportion of these instruments increased in 9 out of 11 new Member States (on which data were available). A considerably more frequent use of the short-term instruments as a means of financing public sector's borrowing needs in the years 2007-2009 was particularly distinct in countries where public debt was mounting very fast (e.g. Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia). Compared with the other Member States, Poland's situation was relatively good in this respect.
After the first wave of the crisis was over and the public debt management institutions made preliminary assessments of the situation, the financing of the public sector with the short-term instruments was promptly abandoned. This was a positive decision that largely reduced the refinancing risk of public debt. In the new Member States most instruments had maturity of 7-10 years [see: Eurostat, Structure of government debt (gov_dd_sgd)], which was a little bit shorter than in the "old" EU members. This reveals distinct differences between countries with a long free-market tradition and the relatively "new" market economies regarding the preferred length of borrowing.
The currency structure of public debt
Whether investors willing to buy Treasury securities or to grant loans (credit) secured by public assets will be sought on the domestic market or abroad directly depends on the currency of the debt to be issued. Instruments denominated in national currencies reduce exchange risk, but issuers frequently choose foreign exchange in order to diversify the range of sources financing the borrowing needs of public authorities, to acquire less expensive capital abroad, or to avoid likely problems with borrowing domestically. Table  3 shows new Member States' debt denominated in national currencies as a proportion of the total public debt in these countries.
According to the data, all new EMU countries borrowed mostly in euro currency. Among the non-euro EU members, debt denominated in national currencies was chosen by countries with relatively stable currencies and welldeveloped economies, having high ratings from the international rating agencies (mainly by the Czech Republic and Poland).
"Smaller" economies (such as Lithuania or Latvia) seek to finance their borrowing needs abroad, so they have to use foreign currencies. In this case, the euro and -to some extent -the US dollar were chosen the most frequently. Besides Lithuania is going to join Eurozone soon. According to the Lithuanian government, it should happen in 2015 [see: Lagarde… 2013 . In such a case, Lithuania uses euro as the "main" currency for public borrowing. The similar example is Estonia, which used former national currency (Estonian Kroon) to a small extent. After joining EMU in the beginning of 2011, the whole public debt was denominated in euro. Cyprus n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Countries with "weaker" currencies and less favourable economic situation, such as Bulgaria or Romania, rarely used debt instruments denominated in national currencies, because their poor ratings made them unattractive for investors. Having to choose foreign currencies, they opted for the strongest of them: the euro and the US dollar. In Bulgaria and Romania, the eurodenominated debt accounted for around 50% and the USD-denominated debt accounted up to 20% of total public debt. It is noticeable, however, that along with the countries' improving ratings (despite continuing financial crisis), they take efforts to change the currency structure of their debt by making a wider use of instruments denominated in national currencies.
The lender structure of public debt
The lender structure of public debt is meant as the various groups of investors that purchase Treasury debt securities (TDS) or grant loans to public authorities. The TDS issuers can specify (in the information memorandum) the target groups of investors to whom particular instruments are addressed. Assessing financial institutions' involvement in lending to the public sector in the period of financial crisis and economic deceleration seems particularly interesting, because the institutions themselves faced major problems which made them considerably reduce their investment activity and attempt to diminish invest-ment risk related to the structure of their assets. One option they could exercise was to purchase TDS carrying, if not zero, at least the lowest risk among all financial assets that were then available in the market. It can therefore be assumed that the financial sector could "absorb" a large part of the public debt increase. This assumption is particularly relevant to countries with high ratings from the international rating agencies. Table 4 shows the proportion of financial institutions in the lender structure of public debt in the Member States. Cyprus % n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a EUR mn n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Slovenia % n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a EUR mn n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a *) -the share of financial institutions in the lender structure of the total public debt (in %) **) -the value of the public debt incurred in the financial institutions (in millions of EUR) n/a -data not available Source: developed by the author based on the Eurostat data: Structure of government debt (gov_dd_sgd) -access date: 30. Sept. 2013.
The reason why two countries are omitted from the lender structure was the lack of data. As for the remaining 10 countries, in the years 2007-2010 (the "first wave" of crisis), only in four of them financial institutions increased their contribution to Member States' public debt and in the other six their share decreased. In several cases changes were minor, so it cannot be concluded that, on principle, financial institutions were increasing their share in public debt. Moreover, it has been found that even if investors considerably increased their purchases of Treasury debt securities they promptly withdrew from their investments as illustrated by the Latvian case. Despite the high interest paid on the Latvian Treasury debt securities (up to 12% in the research period) the poor economic situation (followed by poor ratings) made them unattractive to investors.
In contrast, the Czech Treasury debt securities enjoyed a lively (and increasing) interest from financial institutions. The fast swelling public debt in this country (both in nominal terms and in proportion to GDP) was "absorbed" in the analysed period in a large part by the financial sector, probably attracted by the relatively high ratings. Romanian Treasury securities were also attractive for financial sector. Relatively poor ratings were discounted by high interest rates in this case. The financial institutions' interest in the Polish TDS was relatively strong and fairly stable, because of the country's good rating ("A" by Fitch) and the relatively high interest on its debt instruments (around 5% p.a. on average).
Basing on the data it is very hard to assess the involvement of financial institutions in the process of lending to the public sector. The conclusions of this part of the study remain ambiguous.
Conclusion
In the wake of the expanding borrowing needs of governments the shares of short-term instruments in the structure of public debt increased too. With the recession of the first wave of the financial crisis, the public debt management institutions started to limit their issues of short-term instruments as much as they could, which was a rational thing to do. Therefore, the first research hypothesis has been confirmed.
Public debt management institutions frequently borrowed in national currencies. In the EMU countries (as well as in the counties that were preparing to enter Eurozone in the near future), almost 100% of total public debt was denominated in euro. In the non-euro countries with relatively strong economies, national currencies accounted for most of the public debt. Countries with less advanced economies had to borrow in foreign currencies, their preferred currencies being the euro and the US dollar. The second hypothesis can be considered proven, however bearing in mind that the debt issued by the less developed economies was frequently denominated in strong foreign currencies (especially euro).
The share of financial institutions in the lender structure of public debt is not so straightforward to assess. In some countries the share either did not increase or, after it did, investors started withdrawing their funds once economies reached a relative balance and information about the market situation became available. However, financial institutions invested in the TDS issued by countries where public debt was swelling fast. In this case the probable reason was rather high interest rates on these instruments, and -in some cases -relatively high ratings of these countries (despite their expanding debt). These findings do not provide strong evidence for accepting the third hypothesis as true.
